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Does one need to understand why health is valuable in order to find
enhancement permissible?
In order to understand whether or not enhancement is ethically
permissible through a feminist lens, one must first understand why health is
valuable; otherwise, the point of would be to flee from disease, rather than
pursue a specific, attainable goal. If there were an attainable goal in mind,
enhancement could be permissible. However, if enhancement is simply a
means to avoid amorphous, evolving Illness, then enhancement will never be
permissible.
In her book “An Invitation to Feminist Ethics”, Hilde Lindemann
outlines the problems with traditional, nonfeminist bioethics and explains
how feminist bioethics is a more comprehensive means of solving bioethical
problems. The non-feminist, or dominant, mode of bioethics has four main
characteristics: these are a) abstract rules and principles, b) liberal
individualism, c) an elite and socially powerful clientele, and d) inattention to
most forms of oppression (Lindemann 2004, 109). In contrast, feminist
bioethics is “a bioethics that examines how power in the guise of gender,
race, and other forms of oppression plays itself out in health care practice
and the theory that surrounds that practice,” (Lindemann 2004, 117). As
such, feminist bioethics tracks the responsibilities of all those involved as
they correspond to the patient, and draws attention to the three types of
stories present in any given case – stories of identity, relationship, and values
(Lindemann 2004, 113). In this way, feminist bioethics emphasizes, “that
bioethics is something we do together,” (Lindemann 2004, 114). By situating
people within webs of relationships, feminist bioethics rejects the traditional
bioethics assumptions, “that people are essentially self-reliant, selfinterested, unconnected to others, and in a position to advocate for what they
want,” (Lindemann 2004, 114). In these ways, feminist bioethics allows for
an understanding of how social groups can oppress each other, (Lindemann
2004, 116).
In his essay “Genetic Interventions and the Ethics of Enhancement on
Human Beings” Julian Savulescu proposes an answer to the question, “Should
we use science and medical technology not just to prevent or treat disease,
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but to intervene at the most basic biological levels to improve biology and
enhance people’s lives,” (Savulescu 2007, 604)? In answering this question,
Savulescu argues that enhancement is both permissible and obligatory,
(Savulescu 2007, 604).
The first argument in favor of genetic enhancement is that choosing
not to enhance is wrong, (Savulescu 2007, 605). While, “some argue that it is
not wrong to fail to bring about the best state of affairs,” (Savulescu 2007,
605) in the case of genetic enhancement, where, “there are no other relevant
moral considerations,” (Savulescu 2007, 605), then such a failure is wrong.
The second argument in favor of enhancement, consistency, argues that there
is little to no relevant difference between environmental manipulations and
genetic enhancement, as both can and do permanently affect one’s genetics,
(Savulescu 2007, 605). Thirdly, there is no difference between treating
disease and genetic enhancement: it is the obligation to preserve good health
that creates a moral obligation to treat disease, and this obligation still
applies as a reason to promote genetic enhancement, (Savulescu 2007, 606).
Additionally, one does not need to question why health is valuable – and
engage in the corresponding philosophical arguments - to understand that
disease is bad, (Savulescu 2007, 606). In summary, since biology affects one’s
ability to live well, “biological manipulation to increase opportunity is
ethical,” (Savulescu 2007, 608).
A counterargument to genetic enhancement is eugenics. Savulescu
rejects this comparison, as eugenics is the imposition of a State vision of
health, and is enforced through coercion, for the benefit of society and not for
the benefit of the individual, (Savulescu 2007, 608). The cornerstone of
genetic enhancement should always be autonomy; for this reason, for nonautonomous individuals such as children, genetic intervention should be
delayed if at all possible, (Savulescu 2007, 608-609). In cases where delay is
not possible, the decision to enhance should be left to parents, (Savulescu
2007, 609). Additionally, when contemplating whether or not to enhance
one’s child, the parents need to make the decision for the benefit of the child,
to protect the child’s right to an open future, and to increase all possible
futures, not restrict them, (Savulescu 2007, 609-610).
Savulescu addresses five counterarguments to his claim: ‘Playing God
or Against Nature’, ‘Genetic Discrimination’, ‘The Perfect Child, Sterility and
Loss of the Mystery of Life’, ‘Against Human Nature’, and ‘Enhancements as
Self-Defeating,’ (Savulescu 2007, 610-612). In contrast to ‘Playing God or
Against Nature’, Savulescu argues waiting until the technology of
advancement has been perfected is akin to being responsible for all of the
diseases that happen between now and whenever the technology is finally
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perfected, (Savulescu 2007, 610). In addition, medicine – or rational
evolution – has already changed the process of evolution, and as such,
enhancement is a necessity, not a luxury, (Savulescu 2007, 611). As a
counterpoint to ‘Genetic Discrimination’, Savulescu argues that, “There is no
necessary connection between enhancement and discrimination, just as
there is no necessary connection between curing disability and
discrimination against people with disability,” (Savulescu 2007, 611).
‘Enhancements are Self-Defeating’ argues that enhancements are only
valuable if there is relative gain in comparison to everyone else, (Savulescu
2007, 612). Savulescu argues that there will be many relative and nonrelative qualities to enhancements, (Savulescu 2007, 612). Additionally,
questions about distributive justice are already a problem for things like
education and healthcare, and so such questions should not be a barrier to
the implementation of enhancements, as they are not barriers to people
receiving education or healthcare, (Savulescu 2007, 612).
A feminist bioethicist would have a plethora of issues with Savulescu’s
argument; I address four issues. The cornerstone of a feminist analysis of
Savulescu’s argument focuses on how Savulescu understands enhancement
in the web of relationships that he is a part of, and contrasting that to how
genetic enhancement would affect those that are not in Savulescu’s same
social group.
Savulescu argues that there is an obligation to preserve good health
that drives the moral obligation that people have to try and heal one another.
This observation is faulty, as there is no moral obligation to preserve health,
but to pursue health. If the true aim of medicine were to preserve health, ten
every doctor that has ever had a patient become more ill, or die, would have
failed their moral obligation; this is clearly faulty. To assume that medicine
and healing is so black and white is to assume that people have a level of
agency and independent functioning both within and over illness that is
simply not present. To assume such a premise is to begin to construct a
hierarchy within the practice of medicine: those who get better are more
morally permissible than those who cannot recover. Savulescu assumes a
place of privilege when he assumes that the goal of medicine is perfectly
healthy bodies: rather the goal of medicine should be to collaborate on
patient care in order to achieve the best outcome for all involved.
In addition to assuming an incorrect stance on the goal of medicine,
Savulescu also assumes that one does not need to comprehend what level of
health they wish to attain before attempting to enhance; he argues that
disease is bad, and the avoidance of this end is enough to justify genetic
enhancement. However, in assuming that all diseases – and that all ‘negative’
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traits – are bad, Savulescu employs an abstract principle to justify removing
individuals from their present webs of identity in order to ‘cure’ them. By
blacklisting everything negative, Savulescu ensures that the definition of
‘negative’ will continue to evolve. It also superimposes a hierarchy onto all
social groups, ensuring that the character traits that the dominant social
group believes to be important will endure, while traits of the ‘lower’
socioeconomic classes will be eliminated from the population. This would
result in the eventual elimination of certain types of stories of value, as those
traits or genes deemed ‘undesirable’ would have been engineered out of the
population. On the other hand, a defined goal of ‘health’ – such as the
elimination of Huntington’s, Alzheimer’s, or AIDS – would be a more
attainable, egalitarian goal and does not allow for the evolution of the
meaning of ‘negative’. Additionally, such a goal would allow for individuals to
remain in their current webs of identity, values and relationship while also
allowing them freedom from debilitating and terminal diseases. Savulescu’s
use of the word ‘opportunity’ is telling: yes, enhancements would increase
opportunity (notably he does not use the word ‘health’ here), but
opportunity for whom? His arguments completely fail to address this
problem.
Thirdly, Savulescu attempts to address a potential counterargument
by arguing that enhancement and eugenics are different concepts; he does
this by stating that enhancement is individually-motivated and voluntary,
while eugenics is driven by the state and citizens are coerced into
participating. However, such an argument is based on the idea, “that people
are essentially self-reliant, self-interested, unconnected to others, and in a
position to advocate for what they want,” (Lindemann 2004, 114). Such a
conclusion assumes that the State does not oppress particular classes of
people, whether intentionally or unintentionally, and that everyone in society
has Savulescu’s same level of privilege. Savulescu’s assumption that
enhancement would be applied in a societal vacuum ignores the reality of
existing systemic inequality. [Such ignorance does not create eugenics, but
rather provides a foundation on which eugenics may be actualized.
Finally, Savulescu argues that, “there is no necessary connection
between enhancement and discrimination, just as there is no necessary
connection between curing disability and discrimination against people with
disability,” (Savulescu 2007, 611). He is right in that there is no necessary
connection between these phenomenon; however, to then claim that, just
because a connection is not necessary, that such a connection is not there is
the epitome of privilege. Savulescu completely ignores the existence of, “an
elite and socially powerful clientele,” (Lindemann 2004) and chooses instead
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to argue that ‘just because social classes do not have to oppress one another,
means that oppression does not happen’. In doing so, Savulescu completely
ignores the concept that individuals have contextual factors in their lives that
either prevent then from attaining agency, or prevent them from acting on
the agency that they already have. Furthermore, his argument about
preexisting distributive injustice not being a barrier to implementing genetic
enhancement is false: just because unjust systems already exist is insufficient
justification for the creation of additional unjust systems.
Some potential counterarguments to the feminist analysis presented
are first, the presence of privilege should not be a sufficient reason to justify
withholding technology. Second, that the implementation and use of genetic
enhancement technology by a few will pave the way for greater use by a
larger population. Third, enhancement is a necessity, in order to maximize
human evolutionary potential and maximize benefits for individuals.
The rebuttals are as follows:
First, the presence of privilege should not be a sufficient reason to
justify withholding technology, so long as the technology used is
implemented in such a way that it combats existing oppressive power
structures and respects the networked, collaborative nature of bioethics.
Technology is an amoral tool: it is how that tool is implemented that makes it
ethical or unethical, and under Savulescu’s implementation design genetic
enhancement would serve to empower oppressive structures, rather than
dismantle them.
Second, the implementation and use of genetic enhancement
technology by a few will pave the way for greater use by a larger population
in an uneven way. Technological advances beget technological advances, and
the use of technology by a few will ensure that by the time the technology
becomes disseminated there will be a new technology with the same
distributive justice problems as genetic enhancement. Such a design merely
upholds existing oppressive structures amongst social groups, while
gradually and disproportionately improving the lives of those in other
populations.
Thirdly, human evolution and healthcare occur at a systematic or
group level, not an individual level. The implementation of genetic
enhancement on an individual level would not serve human evolution; rather
it would serve elite groups in such a way that would allow them to remain
elite.
If enhancement is to be implemented in the way that Julian Savulescu
intends, in order to flee from disease, preserve health, and promote
opportunity, then such medical technology cannot be ethically implemented
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when investigated through a feminist theory lens. Counterarguments
regarding individual gain and technological and evolutionary advancement
are equally problematic, because they would also support existing
oppressive power structures. In the existing system, genetic enhancement
would not serve to reform the world as much as it would reinforce all of the
ethical issues currently plaguing healthcare systems. In conclusion, one
needs to understand the definition of health being proposed by the prevailing
power structure, in order to understand whether or not the technology
proposed is going to uphold the injustice in the existing power structure, or
reform it.
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